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Abstract
We introduce knowledge spillovers as an externality in the production
function of competitive …rms operating in a …nite spatial domain under adjustment costs. Spillovers are spatial as productive knowledge ‡ows more
easily among …rms located nearby. When knowledge spillovers are not internalized by …rms spatial agglomerations may emerge endogenously in a
competitive equilibrium, however, they do not emerge at the steady state of
the social optimum.
Keywords: Investment theory, adjustment costs, spatial agglomerations
JEL Classi…cation: D21, R3, C61
1. Introduction
The study of adjustment costs in the investment theory of the …rm dates
back to the 1960s (e.g., Lucas (1967) etc.). A central result obtained by
Scheinkman (1978) indicates that in a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium, where …rms take the perfect foresight price function as given and face
1
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convex adjustment costs in net investment, each …rm’s capital stock converges to a unique steady state which is independent of initial conditions.
When …rms are identical all …rms will converge in the long run to the same
stock of capital.
We revisit adjustment costs and the investment theory of the …rm by considering a competitive industry operating in a …nite spatial domain. Firms
can be located at any point in the domain but their production function
can be a¤ected by knowledge spillovers stemming from …rms located nearby.
Knowledge spillovers are regarded as positive intra-industry Marshalian externalities which are bounded in space, the main idea being that innovation and new productive knowledge ‡ows more easily among agents which
are located within the same area (e.g. Krugman (1991), Feldman (1999),
Breschi and Lissoni (2001). We introduce these knowledge spillovers as a Lucas/Romer type of externality in the production function. This externality
is modeled by a kernel de…ned over the stock of capital of the …rms located
in the spatial domain.
We study whether the interplay between adjustment cost in expanding
the stock of capital and the knowledge spillovers generated from the expanded capital stock induce endogenous agglomerations and spatial clustering of …rms in a competitive industry where pro…t maximizing …rms take the
price function and knowledge spillovers as parametric.
Our results suggest that endogenous agglomerations may emerge as a
long-run steady state of a perfect foresight rational expectations competitive
equilibrium (PF-RECE), where the distribution of capital stocks and outputs
across space is not uniform. On the other hand at a social optimum, where
a planner endogenizes spatial spillovers, agglomerations do not emerge, and
all …rms converge to the same stock of capital irrespective of location.
Our contribution is twofold. First we provide a conceptual framework
that explains the dynamic endogenous emergence of spatial clustering in a
competitive industry. Second, we show how convexity arguments and spectral theory can be used to study PF-RECE problems and social optimum
problems in spatiotemporal economies, by properly decomposing the spatial
and the temporal behavior. These provide valuable insights regarding the en2
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dogenous emergence (or not) of optimal agglomerations at a PF-RECE and
the social optimum of competitive industry. The possibility of a potential
agglomeration at a PF-RECE is related to the incomplete internalization of
the spatial externality by optimizing …rms, while the “no agglomerations”
result at the social optimum stems from the full internalization of the spatial
externality by a social planner and the strict concavity of the production
function.
2. Spatial Knowledge Spillovers and Adjustment Costs
We consider an industry consisting of a large number of …rms with each
…rm located at point x of a one-dimensional bounded spatial domain X =
[ L; L].2 We assume that X is discretized, i.e., it is divided into N intervals
or cells Ii , i = 1;
; N , such that X = [N
i=1 Ii ; and to save space we will
denote by N := f1; 2;
; N g and use the compact notation i 2 N . We con…ne our analysis to a …nite dimensional space, because studying a continuum
of …rms would make the state space in…nite dimensional and the mathematical background necessary to study such a problem would exceed space
limitations. However, the problem studied here as well as other economic optimization problems are extendable to in…nite dimensional state spaces using
our methods (e.g. Brock et al. (2012)).
Each …rm produces at time t 2 R+ and location x 2 X a single homogenous output y (t; x). To simplify we assume that the output is uniform
within each cell or site, i.e. y(t; x) = yi (t) for every x 2 Ii , so that the state
of the system at time t, is given by a vector y(t) = (y1 (t);
; yN (t)) 2
RN . Local output y(t; x) is produced by two factors of production, local capital stock k(t; x) and accumulated knowledge K(t; x) according to
a strictly concave and su¢ ciently smooth neoclassical production function
@2f
> 0. We
f : R+ R+ ! R+ ; y(t; x) = f (k (t; x) ; K (t; x)) ; with @k@K
also assume that k and K are uniform within each cell, so that k(t; x) is
replaced by a vector k(t) = (k1 (t);
; kN (t)) 2 RN , and K(t; x) is replaced
by K(t) = (K1 (t);
; KN (t)) 2 RN . Therefore, the production at time t
and at cell i is given by yi (t) = f (ki (t); Ki (t)).
2

d

Most of our results can be estended to general domains of chracteristics X
1:

Rd ,
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Knowledge represents and intra-industry positive externality and is determined, at time t and cell i, by the existing capital stock at nearby cells
j. The local capital stock at each cell j, contributes to the total knowledge
spillovers at cell i according to a weight function wij , therefore, the total
e¤ect at cell i is
N
X
Ki (t) =
wij kj (t):
j=1

We will also use the compact notation K = W k where W = (wij ), i; j =
1;
; N is an RN N matrix. If wij = 0 for a pair (i; j), then cell j does not
contribute at all to the total knowledge spillovers at site i. For simplicity
we assume that wij = w(ji jj) for some function w, which implies that
distance, and not the actual locations, is fundamental in determining nonlocal e¤ects. Matrix W de…nes the connectivity of the “knowledge network”.
If, for example, wij = j;i+1 + j;i 1 2 j;i , where i;j is the Kronecker delta,
we have a linear connectivity of the knowledge network, according to which
site i interacts only with sites i + 1 and i 1. The connectivity of sites 1
and N , in some sense is related with the choice of boundary conditions. If,
for example, periodic boundary conditions are imposed so that we consider
the network as situated on a circle, then site 1 interacts with site N that is
now considered as its neighbor. We wish to emphasize, however, that our
analysis is valid for a general choice of network, i.e., for a general choice of
matrix W .
P
An important class of networks are those that satisfy the condition j wij =
w, independent of the choice of i. A particular example for such a coupling is
the matrix wij = j;i+1 + j;i 1 2 j;i which satis…es this condition for w = 0.
We will call such couplings di¤usive type couplings. It means that if the stock
of capital is uniform across all sites and equal to k then every site i is going
to experience an externality equal to wk. The adoption of this condition on
the network will allow us to establish some important and general results
concerning the possibility or not of emergence of spatial agglomerations in
the economy.
Knowledge externality Ki (t) will have di¤erent interpretations in di¤erent contexts. If Ki (t) represents a type of knowledge which is produced
4
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proportionately to capital usage, it is natural to assume that the kernel w
considered as a function of = i j is single peaked and bell-shaped, with
a maximum at = 0; and of su¢ ciently fast decay to 0 for su¢ ciently large
j j. If Ki (t) re‡ects aggregate bene…ts of knowledge produced at (t; i) for
producers at (t; i) and damages to production at (t; i) from usage of capital
at (t; j), then non-monotonic shapes of w with, for example, a single peak
at = 0 and two local minima located symmetrically around = 0, with
negative values indicating damages to production at i from usage of capital
at j, are plausible. This production function could be considered as a spatial
version of a neoclassical production function with Romer/Lucas externalities
modelled by geographical spillovers given by a Krugman (see e.g., Krugman
(1996)), or Chincarini and Asherie type speci…cation (see e.g. Chincarini and
Asherie (2008)).
The temporal rate of change of capital stock is given by the derivative
with respect to time, k 0 ; of the vector valued function k : R+ ! RN . The
…rm faces a cost of changing the capital stock, which depends on the value
of the function k 0 . This adjustment cost at time t and cell i is expressed
by a quadratic adjustment function Ci (t) = 2 (ki0 (t))2 , > 0. Capital stock
depreciates at the same rate in all sites:
The output of the …rms is sold at a market price determined by a demand
function D : R ! R+ .
p (t) = D(Q) = D (Q (k; K)) ; D > 0; D0 < 0
Q := Q (k; K) =

N
X

f (ki (t); Ki (t)) :

(1)
(2)

i=1

The k and K dependence is stated explicitly to emphasize that D can be
understood as a functional D : RN RN ! R; given k, we obtain K = W k,
and calculate the total output Q that determines the price p. Assuming
perfect capital markets and that the unit price of capital is q independent
of time, the objective of a …rm located at i 2 N is to maximize the present
value of pro…ts by considering knowledge spillovers as exogenous Ki = Kie .

5
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The …rm’s problem can be written as:
max
0
ki

Z

1

e

rt

0

h

p (t) f (ki ; Kie )

ki (0) = ki0 ; ki (t)

2

2

(ki0 )

0; i 2 N :

i
q (ki0 + ki ) dt

(3)
(4)

Given this set up we de…ne the industry equilibrium and the social optimum and explore conditions that could generate endogenous spatial clustering of …rms.
3. Industry Equilibrium and Social Optimum
Following (Lucas and Prescott (1971), Brock (1974), Brock and Scheinkman
(1977)) we de…ne a PF-RECE as the price function p (t) given by (1) where
ki (t) solves (3) for all i 2 N with optimality conditions evaluated at K e =
W k: If the price path p (t) is predicted by the competitive …rms, this path
will result in an aggregate output Q over the whole spatial domain such that
the market is cleared at each t by p (t:)
The long-run properties of the industry equilibrium can be obtained by
exploiting the technique of maximizing consumer surplus (Lucas and Prescott
(1971), Brock (1974), Brock and Scheinkman (1977)). Two optimization
problems leading to di¤erent concepts of equilibria can be de…ned in this
context:
(A) The problem of maximizing consumer surplus when …rms are regarding
knowledge spillovers as exogenous, that is when they do not internalize
the spatial externality and they set Ki (t) = K e , de…ned as:
max
0
k

Z

1

e

rt

0

S (k; K) =

Z

(

S (k; K e )

Q(k;K)

N h
X
i=1

D (u) du

2

2

(ki0 )

)
i
q (ki0 + ki ) dt

(5)
(6)

0

Thus the …rm treats K e as parametric, but the actions of all …rms
generate the “actual”value of the realized knowledge externality which
is W k and which determines the equilibrium outcome. The solution to
this problem for K e = W k determines the PF-RECE.
6
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(B) The problem of maximizing consumer surplus when a social planner
fully internalizes the spatial externality. This means
max
0
k

Z

1

e

rt

0

(

S (k; W k)

N h
X
i=1

2

(ki0 )

2

)
i
q (ki0 + ki ) dt

(7)

The solution to this problem determines the social optimum.
The Euler equations for these two problem can be obtained in a straightforward manner, using e.g. the Pontryagin maximum principle. A straightforward analysis leads to expressing the Euler equations for the PF-RECE
problem (5) as
00

rki0 +

ki

1

@
S(k; K e )
@ki

K e =W k

q (r + ) = 0; i 2 N ;

(8)

means that we …rst take the gradient
where the notation @k@ i S(k; K e )
K e =W k
of S(k; K e ) with respect to k, treating K e as …xed, and then substitute
K e = W k in the resulting function to determine the PF-RECE. For the
social optimum, problem (7), the Euler equation is:
00

ki

rki0 +

1

@
S(k; W k)
@ki

q (r + ) = 0; i 2 N :

(9)

This leads to the following de…nition:
De…nition 1 A solution k : R+ ! RN of (8), with K e = W k is called a
PF-RECE. while a solution of (9) is called a social optimum.
Note that in the social optimum @k@ i S(k; W k) are the components of the
true gradient of function S, treated as a function of k only, i.e., the true
gradient of the function S(k; W k). This is in contrast to what happens
for the PF-RECE where @k@ i S(k; K e )
, no longer correspond to the
K e =W k
components of a “true” gradient of a function. This remark plays a very
important role to the qualitative long term behavior of the two systems and
leads to important di¤erences between them.
7
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4. Long term behavior of the social optimum: A global result
We provide a global result concerning the spatial structure, i.e. the possibility of agglomerations, as a long run outcome at the social optimum.
Proposition 2 If the system of equations
@
S(k; W k)
@ki

q (r + ) = 0; i 2 N ;

(10)

admits the spatially uniform k1 =
= kN = k solution, then no spatial
patterns are admissible in the long run equilibrium for the social optimum.
Proof: De…ne the functions S : RN ! R, by S(k) := S(k; W k)
Rx
^
^
q (r + ) k and S^ : R ! R by S(x)
= 0 D(u)du. The function S(x)
is strictly
concave as the integral of a strictly decreasing function, and by the properties
of the production function the function S(k; W k) a strictly concave function
of k. Therefore, function S(k) is strictly concave. The Euler equation can
be written as
k 00 rk 0 = rS;
and by the convexity of S, the operator rS is a monotone operator
on RN . By Theorem 3.3 of Rouhani and Khatibzadeh (2009) any bounded
solution of these systems converges to the steady state which is a solution
of (10).3 The solution of this equation is recognized as the minimum of the
function S respectively, which is unique by strict convexity. Therefore, the
result follows.
QED
Finally we provide below conditions under which no agglomerations are
possible at the social optimum.
P
Assumption 3 The coupling is of di¤usive type, i.e.
j wij = w for any
i 2 N , and the production function is homogeneous of degree .
Proposition 4 Let Assumption 3 hold. If the scalar algebraic equation
N
3

1

1

D(s)s

1

q (r + ) = 0;

:= f (1; w)

(11)

This approach is readily extendable to in…nite dimensional state spaces.
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admits a solution s 2 R+ , then no agglomeration patterns may appear in
the long run equilibrium for the social optimum and the industry relaxes to a
1

spatially homogeneous state k1 =

s
N

= kN = k =

.

Proof: The steady state is given by the solution of the system of equations
0

D(Q(k; W k)) @fk (ki ;

X

wij kj ) +

X

wri fK (ki ;

r

j

X
j

1

wrj kj )A

q (r + ) = 0; i 2 N ;

which for a spatially uniform solution k1 =
= kN = k and using
Assumption 3 reduces to single algebraic equation, which is equivalent to
(11), in terms of the variable s = N (k ) . Then using Proposition 2 we
obtain the stated result.
QED
5. Agglomeration patterns in the perfect foresight rational expectations equilibrium
The situation is di¤erent for the PF-RECE, where the term @k@ i S(k; K e )
K e =W k
is no longer a gradient so that in general we may not have a result similar
to Proposition 2. Therefore, spatial agglomerations may emerge through the
perturbation of a spatially homogeneous steady state, in a fashion which is
similar (but di¤erent in mechanism) to the celebrated Turing instability. The
next proposition presents such a case.
Proposition 5 Let Assumption 3 hold, and de…ne the real numbers
fk (1; w), K := fK (1; w), kK := fkK (1; w).
1

k

:=

1

q(r + ) = 0
1. If the scalar algebraic equation N1
k D(s)s
admits a solution s 2 R+ , then a spatially homogeneous steady state k =
1

s
N

exists.
2. Suppose 1 is true and de…ne the matrix T := C1 I + C2 W + C3 1, where
I is the N N identity matrix, 1 is an N N matrix consisting of 1’s and
C1 :=

1

k

2

D(s )

kk ; C2

:=

1

k

2

D(s )

kK ; C3

:=

1

k

2(

1)

D0 (s )

k( k

+w

K );

2

(i) If the matrix T has eigenvalues greater than r4 , then pattern formation
(agglomerations) may appear, whereas (ii) if T has positive eigenvalues but

9
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2

less than r4 , then a temporally oscillating spatial agglomeration may appear
around the spatially homogeneous steady state k .
Proof: 1. The steady state will be a solution of
D(Q(k; W k)) fk (ki ;

X

!

wij kj )

j

q (r + ) = 0; i 2 N ;

and the proof proceeds using similar arguments as in Proposition 4.
2. We now look for the evolution of a spatially non homogeneous perturbation of this homogeneous steady state. Consider a solution of (8) of the
form ki = k + pi , i 2 N , where is a small parameter. We substitute into
(8) and linearize with respect to . After some tedious algebra, and keeping
in mind the properties of the production function we obtain the linearized
system,
p00 rp0 + T p = 0:
(12)
The matrix T is symmetric, so there exists an orthonormal basis of RN
consisting of the eigenvectors of T . Projecting (12) along the eigenvectors,
P
the general solution of (12) can be expressed as p(t) = N
`=1 q` (t) ` where
00
0
q`
rq` + ` q` = 0; ` 2 N , and now the system is decoupled, with its
p
r2 4 ` ),
behavior given in terms of the characteristic roots v` = 21 (r
2
i ,
` 2 N which lead to 3 possibilities: (A) r4 < ` , so that v` = 2r
i.e., a pair of complex conjugate roots. (oscillatory behavior compatible with
2
the transversality condition - Hopf type behavior). (B) 0 < ` < r4 , so
that v` < 2r < v`+ , i.e., a pair of real roots, one larger (thus rejected by
transversality) and one smaller than 2r (leading to instability as long as it is
positive). (C) ` < 0, so that v` < 0 < 2r < v`+ , i.e., a pair of real roots,
one negative (thus stable) and one positive larger than 2r (thus rejected by
transversality). Thus case B could lead to pattern formation.
QED
Note that: In general k 6= k , i.e. the steady state of the social optimum
problem does not coincide with the steady state of the RE-PFCE; case (i) is
reminiscent of a Turing instability with the major di¤erence that is related
to a controlled system, which implies that all behavior has to be compatible with the transversality condition; case (ii) is in turn related to a Hopf
10

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper819

10

Brock et al.: Adjustment Costs and Long Run Spatial Agglomerations

type bifurcation. Furthermore, the conditions for pattern formation in the
linearized problem are related to the spectrum of the symmetric matrix T ,
which is easily computed for concrete applications, numerically. The concavity of the production function and the monotonicity of the demand function,
provide important information on the signs of the constants C1 ; C2 ; C3 and
thus allow us to obtain general information concerning the position of the
spectrum of the matrix T .
Finally, and most important for the economics of the industry, in the
PF-RECE, we do not expect in general an analogue of Proposition 2, since
is
as observed in the beginning of this section the term @k@ i S(k; K e )
K e =W k
no longer a gradient. The local behavior described for the linearized system
around the homogenous steady state k, by Proposition 5 suggests that it is
possible for some of the unstable modes leading to spatial patterns for the
linearized system to persist, leading thus the PF-RECE to long-run stable
agglomerations. It is interesting to note that this is in contrast to the socially
optimum, where agglomerations and clustering in the long run are de…nitely
ruled out by Proposition 2. In terms of economics this means that diminishing returns in both the stock of capital and knowledge spillovers, expressed by
fkk (k; K) ; fKK (k; K) ; K = W k respectively, eradicate any spatial patterns
when knowledge spillovers are internalized at the …rm level. When, however,
knowledge spillovers are not internalized then interactions of the complementarity between the stock of capital and the knowledge spillover expressed by
fkK (k; K) ; with the diminishing returns in the stock of capital, may induce
the emergence of spatial agglomeration which could become persistent.
6. Concluding Remarks
We revisit adjustment costs and the investment theory of the …rm in a
spatial context where knowledge spillovers, which are regarded as a positive
externality in the production function, are determined by spatial proximity
of …rms. We show that spatial agglomerations may emerge endogenously in
a PF-RECE where …rms do not internalize spatial knowledge spillovers, however, they do not emerge at the social optimum when knowledge spillovers
are internalized. Our result suggest therefore that agglomerations are possible as a long run equilibrium outcome in a competitive industry with spatial
11
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knowledge spillovers without the presence of increasing returns.
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